Pahalgam Attack, Palestine and India’s Wider Regional Diplomatic Strategy
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That does not mean New Delhi treats them as one conflict. The Pahalgam attack is linked to India-Pakistan security tensions; Palestine remains part of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute; and the confrontation involving Iran has created separate questions about maritime security, energy and regional stability.
What connects them is the way India is handling all three at the same time.
At the September 12–13, 2026 BRICS Summit in New Delhi, member states condemned the April 22, 2025 terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir, while also reaffirming support for Palestinian statehood, humanitarian access and a two-state solution. The same summit brought India into direct discussions with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Russian President Vladimir Putin and other leaders while New Delhi continued its separate engagement with the United States.
The broader picture is therefore less about a single Indian position and more about how New Delhi manages different relationships and issues without allowing one regional dispute to dominate all of its foreign policy.
The Pahalgam Attack Remains a Diplomatic Issue
The April 2025 Pahalgam terrorist attack killed 26 people in Jammu and Kashmir. Reuters reported that a group calling itself Kashmir Resistance claimed responsibility, while Indian authorities linked the attackers to Pakistan-based militants, a connection Pakistan has denied.
The disagreement did not end with the 2025 military crisis.
Pakistan has continued to reject India’s allegations and has repeatedly called for an independent, transparent and credible investigation. In a July 16, 2026 briefing, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry again rejected what it described as Indian attempts to link Pakistan to the Pahalgam attack.
This distinction is important for understanding the diplomatic record.
There is broad international condemnation of terrorism and of the killing of civilians. That is different from an international finding that Pakistan as a state was responsible for the attack.
The 2026 BRICS New Delhi Declaration reflected that difference. The document explicitly condemned the April 2025 attack, called for accountability and reaffirmed opposition to terrorism, including terrorism financing and cross-border movement of militants. At the same time, it did not name Pakistan in connection with the attack and did not endorse India’s subsequent military action.
That wording gave New Delhi an important piece of diplomatic recognition on the issue while leaving the question of state responsibility outside the joint declaration.
Why BRICS Matters to India’s Kashmir Narrative
The BRICS reference to the Pahalgam attack matters because it places the incident inside a wider multilateral framework.
India has long sought international support for the principle that terrorism should be confronted without religious or ethnic justification. The New Delhi Declaration reinforced that language, including a call for “zero tolerance” toward terrorism and for those responsible and those supporting terrorist activity to be held accountable under applicable law.
But BRICS also demonstrated the limits of that approach.
The bloc includes China, Iran and the United Arab Emirates alongside India, Russia and other major developing economies. Its members have different relationships with India and different positions on regional conflicts. Reuters reported that the 2026 summit required consensus between countries with sharply different positions on the Middle East.
The result was a carefully framed declaration rather than a document assigning responsibility for every dispute.
That is significant for India because international diplomacy often works through language that allows governments to agree on principles without agreeing on every underlying political claim.
Palestine Is a Separate Track—and India Has Kept It Open
India’s position on Palestine has evolved alongside a deepening relationship with Israel.
In February 2026, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced expanded defense cooperation, including joint development, production and technology transfer in the defense sector. The two countries were also working toward a free trade agreement.
At the same time, India has continued to publicly support a negotiated two-state solution.
At the June 2026 UNRWA pledging conference, India said it had provided more than $175 million in assistance to the Palestinian people and reaffirmed support for a sovereign Palestinian state living alongside Israel in peace and security. India also said it had supplied about 150 tons of humanitarian and disaster-relief material over the previous three years.
That position was reinforced in August.
India and the Palestinian Authority signed agreements covering a 200-bed super-specialty hospital and a vocational training center, while India again described its position as support for the Palestinian people and a negotiated two-state solution.
India’s policy is therefore not accurately described simply as either pro-Israel or pro-Palestinian.
The record shows two parallel relationships: expanding strategic cooperation with Israel while maintaining humanitarian, development and diplomatic engagement with the Palestinians.
What Did BRICS Say About Gaza?
The 2026 BRICS declaration placed the Palestinian issue alongside broader questions about international law, humanitarian conditions and multilateral diplomacy.
The document reaffirmed support for the full UN membership of the State of Palestine, endorsed a two-state solution based on the internationally recognized 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state, and called for a peaceful and lasting settlement. It also supported humanitarian access and rejected forced displacement.
Those positions were welcomed by the Palestinian Foreign Ministry, which specifically highlighted the declaration’s references to statehood, UN membership, humanitarian assistance and opposition to forced displacement.
For India, the significance is that its Palestine policy can operate within a broader Global South framework rather than being presented solely as a bilateral issue with Israel.
That gives New Delhi room to maintain dialogue with Israel while also participating in multilateral language on Palestinian statehood and humanitarian concerns.
Iran Adds a Maritime and Energy Dimension
The Iran question introduces another set of practical interests.
Ahead of the BRICS summit, Modi met Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in New Delhi. According to India’s prime minister’s office, Modi stressed the need for continued efforts toward regional peace and specifically emphasized freedom of navigation, commercial activity and the safety of seafarers. Reuters reported that the discussion took place against the backdrop of renewed U.S.-Iran hostilities and the disruption of regional maritime routes.
This is important for India because the regional crisis is not only diplomatic.
The conflict affects shipping, energy supplies and Indian nationals working at sea. India has consequently had to discuss Iran through the lens of both foreign policy and economic security.
The issue also intersects with India’s relationship with Russia. Modi met Putin in New Delhi immediately before the BRICS summit, with the two sides discussing trade, defense, energy and the effect of conflicts in West Asia and the Black Sea on maritime commerce and Indian seafarers. Reuters also noted that India has continued purchasing Russian oil despite pressure from Washington.
The result is a foreign-policy environment in which energy security cannot easily be separated from diplomacy.
The United States Remains Another Essential Relationship
India’s relationship with Washington adds another layer.
On September 30, Modi and U.S. President Donald Trump spoke by telephone and reaffirmed their commitment to the India-U.S. Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership. Their discussion covered trade, defense, energy, critical technologies and wider regional and international issues.
This is taking place while India also maintains active engagement with Russia and Iran and remains a major participant in BRICS.
The observable pattern is therefore one of multiple diplomatic channels rather than exclusive alignment with a single bloc.
That approach gives India the ability to discuss different subjects with different partners, but it also creates competing pressures. Relations with Washington can be affected by India’s Russian energy purchases. Engagement with Iran has to account for U.S. sanctions and the security situation around the Gulf. Cooperation with Israel exists alongside India’s continued support for Palestinian statehood.
The challenge is managing these relationships without allowing one area to undermine another.
Where the Issues Actually Connect
The Pahalgam attack, Palestine and India’s regional diplomacy should not be merged into one narrative simply because they appeared in the same BRICS discussions.
Their real connections are more specific.
Security
The Pahalgam issue concerns terrorism, cross-border militancy and India-Pakistan security.
The Iran crisis involves military escalation, maritime threats and regional stability.
Energy and Trade
Disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz and other sea lanes affect oil prices, shipping costs and supply chains. Those pressures matter directly to India as a large energy importer. India’s own official statements have repeatedly emphasized safe navigation and maritime commerce during the regional crisis.
Multilateral Diplomacy
BRICS provides a forum where India can work with countries that do not share the same bilateral relationships or strategic preferences.
The 2026 summit showed that members could still agree on broad language covering terrorism, the Middle East and Palestine despite major differences among individual states.
These are practical points of connection. They do not mean the conflicts themselves have become one issue.
Why China’s Position Matters
China’s role is particularly important because Beijing maintains a close strategic relationship with Pakistan while also participating in BRICS alongside India.
At the 2026 New Delhi summit, China joined the consensus on the BRICS declaration that condemned the Pahalgam attack without naming Pakistan. The same declaration also supported Palestinian statehood and a two-state solution.
That combination illustrates how multilateral diplomacy can separate general principles from bilateral disputes.
China could support a statement against terrorism without endorsing every Indian claim about the Pahalgam incident.
For India, that creates space for international discussion of terrorism even when bilateral diplomatic disagreements remain unresolved.
For Pakistan, it also demonstrates that strategic relationships do not necessarily guarantee that every partner will adopt Islamabad’s position in a multilateral forum.
The Limits of India’s Balancing Approach
Maintaining several diplomatic relationships does not remove the underlying contradictions.
A sharper India-Pakistan confrontation could make cooperation with China more difficult.
A prolonged Iran crisis could put additional pressure on India’s energy imports and maritime trade.
A worsening Gaza conflict could complicate India’s effort to deepen strategic ties with Israel while maintaining credibility with Arab and wider Global South partners.
Pressure from Washington over Russian energy purchases can introduce another constraint.
These are not hypothetical tensions detached from current policy. India is already dealing with the overlap of trade, defense, energy and regional security in its relations with the United States, Russia, Iran and Israel.
What Should Observers Watch Next?
Several developments will provide a clearer indication of how India’s regional diplomacy evolves.
First, the Pahalgam file. Any new findings, investigations or security incidents involving Jammu and Kashmir could again place India-Pakistan tensions at the center of international diplomacy.
Second, Palestine. India’s continued humanitarian and development assistance, along with its two-state position, will show how it manages the gap between relations with Israel and engagement with the Palestinian Authority.
Third, Iran and maritime security. Further disruption around the Strait of Hormuz would raise the importance of India’s calls for freedom of navigation and the protection of seafarers.
Fourth, BRICS. The practical question is whether the group can continue producing consensus statements on difficult geopolitical issues despite differences among its members.
Fifth, India-U.S. relations. Trade, defense, energy and technology negotiations will remain relevant as New Delhi manages its broader external relationships. The September 30 Modi-Trump conversation showed that those channels remain active.
The Broader Strategic Picture
The most useful way to read India’s recent diplomacy is not as an attempt to place every regional conflict under one umbrella.
It is better understood as a series of parallel tracks.
The Pahalgam attack remains part of India’s campaign for stronger international attention to terrorism and cross-border security concerns.
Palestine remains a separate diplomatic issue in which India continues to support a two-state solution while deepening cooperation with Israel.
Iran and the Strait of Hormuz represent a different problem centered on maritime security, energy and regional stability.
BRICS provides the platform where some of these issues now appear alongside one another, even though the underlying disputes remain distinct.
That gives India room to maintain engagement across competing regional and global groupings, but it also requires careful diplomacy. The more interconnected trade, energy, security and multilateral politics become, the harder it becomes to isolate one dispute from its economic or strategic consequences.
As of October 1, 2026, India was simultaneously engaging the United States, Russia and Iran, maintaining defense cooperation with Israel, supporting Palestinian statehood in multilateral forums, and using BRICS to advance language on terrorism and international diplomacy.
The central question is therefore not whether India will choose one side across all of these disputes. The record shows that New Delhi is pursuing issue-specific positions across several relationships.
The harder test will be whether that approach can continue to absorb new security crises without forcing India to make trade-offs that become increasingly difficult to manage.
Last updated: October 1, 2026.
Amjad Ali Abid is a Senior Analyst at The American Times, specializing in U.S. Politics, Global Finance, and Economic Policy. With a focus on fact-based reporting, his analysis is based on primary sources, official data, and verified reports from Reuters, Associated Press, and U.S. Government releases.
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